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PROF. GOLDIE: Welcome to the regional meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law. Today's topic, Refinancing of 
Third World Debt, will be broken into two discussions, the first 
dealing with the private sector; the second with the public sector. 
We will begin our first session by comparing the credit worthiness 
of the Second World, the Communist world, to that of the develop-
ing countries that we call the Third World. 
PROF. LILLICH: Current newspaper accounts show a certain 
degree of concern over the obligations of the Communist bloc, or the 
Second World. 1 There are substantial political considerations with 
respect to the debts of these Communist countries, particularly in 
the case of Poland. 2 This situation has produced all kinds of internal 
stresses. The necessity of stretching out, rescheduling or renegotiat-
ing the debts of these countries presents problems of a slightly dif-
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1. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1977, §1, at 2, col. 3; id., June 17, 1977, §4, at 12, col. 1; id., 
April 4, 1977, at 45, col. 1; The Times (London), Jan. 27, 1977, at 23c; Wall St. J., April 14, 
1977, at 35, col. 3; id., March 16, 1977, at 2°4, col. 6; id., Feb. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 6; id., at 20, 
col. 2. 
2. See N.Y. Times, April 4, 1977, at 45, col. 1. 
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ferent degree than the problems of the Third World countries. 
It is usually accepted in the business world that the Communist 
countries are very solid borrowers. With the exception of North 
Korea, we have not had any difficulty in the collection of Commun-
ist countries' debts. 3 But, I do recall that we still have claims arising 
from the Soviet nationalizations of 1917 through 1919, on which 
interest has accrued over the last fifty years in a sizeable amount. 
The Soviets made only a partial payment under the Litvinov As-
signment. 4 I wonder why this is not perceived to be as great a prob-
lem. Because the problem is not a result of the oil price increases of 
1973 and 1974 it may not have received the attention that the Third 
World problems have. 
MR. HAWLEY: There has not been a case of default in recent 
history. The Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union 
clearly recognize the necessity of being punctual and proper in 
meeting every letter of the loan agreements to continue to reap the 
benefits of access to Western capital markets. Not all of the Second 
World countries can borrow effectively in the West. Those that can 
have an asset they would not likely throw away. 
The North Korean case is an anomaly in the sense that United 
States banks are not involved, but some European banks do have a 
problem.5 I think we are operating, not just on the assumption that 
the past is always a guideline to the future, but rather on the recog-
nition that one cannot focus exclusively on past or present condi-
tions. Second World countries have to recognize that they are going 
to have capital needs in the future and that the Soviet bloc cannot 
easily manage its affairs without access to Western capital markets. 
This strong determinant tends to keep their payments on schedule. 
MR. BELLER: The major question that a banker would ask 
before extending credit to a sovereign is, can he repay it? The East-
ern bloc countries to which we are extending credit are countries 
that we are confident will be able to repay us. These countries have 
centralized economies which can be manipulated to insure the 
availability of foreign exchange to repay the bank when payment 
comes due. Most of the lending, if not all of it, is done on a short 
term basis, which is safer for the bank. This is partly a result of the 
3. The Times (London), Jan. 27, 1977, at 23c. See also id., Jan. 11, 1977, at 15g. 
4. Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918-1938), 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. 253, 262-64 
(1939). 
5. The banks involved in the North Korean case are primarily Australian, British, 
French, Belgian, and West German institutions. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1977, at 45, col. 1. 
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Johnson Act,6 which prevented U.S. banks and other U.S. citizens 
from lending money to countries that defaulted on their debts to the 
United States or U.S. citizens, except to finance short term trade.7 
So, Russia, for example, can only receive short term trade financing, 
which is inherently a little safer from the bank's point of view than 
extending them five or ten year loans. 
My bank maintains a bank in Rumania and, so far as I know, 
it is the only Western bank in that area of the world. The relations 
have been excellent. It has been a mutually satisfying relationship. 
There are common motivations which prompt these countries to live 
up to every promise that they have made. We believe that they will 
continue to do that. 
MR. ROBERTSON: The public position of the Eastern European 
countries, with respect to the issues that the Third World has raised 
in the United Nations, is that they are not in any way responsible 
for the economic · disruption of the last few years. Since Eastern 
European countries have centrally planned economies and are not 
subject to the capitalist market forces that the rest of the world is 
subject to, they do not feel any particular responsibility to aid Third 
World countries. The Eastern European countries did agree to par-
ticipate in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD),8 but they made it clear that they were participat-
ing as observers and were not to be actively involved in creating a 
system for debt renegotiation. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Dr. Adede, would you like to make some gen-
eral comments? 
DR. AoEoE: The record of repayment of Wes tern commercial 
bank loans has been almost perfect. We understand that when one 
of the countries gets into trouble, the Kremlin helps the particular 
country make its payment on time. 
MR. TRIMBLE: The principal problem encountered in talking 
6. Johnson Debt Default Act, ch. 112, 48 Stat. 574 (1934), as amended by ch. 399, § 9, 
59 Stat. 516 (1945) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1976)). 
7. 42 OP. ATI'Y GEN. No. 27 (May 9, 1967); 42 OP. ATI'Y GEN. No. 15 (Oct. 9, 1963); 37 
OP. A'IT'Y GEN. 505 (1934) . 
8. UNCTAD was established as a permanent organ of the United Nations General As-
sembly on December 30, 1964, G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/5815 (1965). The primary objective of the Conference is to develop a coordinated set of 
policies to be adopted by all member states, with a purpose of stimulating the economic 
development of developing countries. Id. For an evaluation of the work UNCTAD has engaged 
in with respect to the debt problem of the developing world, see Adede, Loan Agreements 
Between Developing Countries and Foreign Commercial Banks-Reflections on Some Legal 
and Economic Issues, 5 SvR. J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 235, 236 (1977). 
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about Soviet or Eastern bloc lending policies, or debt problems, is 
the rigid wall of secrecy with which they surround their financial 
dealings. We have for years tried to get the Soviet Union to give us 
some indication of their foreign exchange position or their foreign 
reserve position. In all of these cases, we have enormous difficulty 
in getting any official confirmation of hard figures which govern-
ments or banks can use to make reasonable estimates of what the 
lending limits ought to be. The only other thing that might affect 
U.S. Government loans would be the political sensitivity that loans 
to Eastern bloc countries would have. There is still a great political 
sensitivity to lending to East European countries and forcing repay-
ment. 
Hungary has just repaid a long standing obligation growing 
out of World War I in order to avoid the Johnson Act. 9 I expect that 
now they will be coming to Mr. Hawley's and Mr. Beller's doors to 
take advantage of this new-found liberation. We made them pay 
interest in accordance with the original one percent loan agreement 
plus three or four percent. The interest constituted a large part of 
the payment. The original principal obligation was almost insignifi-
cant. 
PROF. GOLDIE: I would like to first ask Mr. Beller, and then 
Mr. Hawley, their views on Dr. Adede's distinction between borrow-
ers and those who may be called partners. 10 
MR. BELLER: I would use the word partner in a context which 
has a more limited application. "Unity of interest" is really a more 
appropriate term. Partner implies a certain legal relationship. I do 
not think a debtor-creditor relationship is in any way a partnership 
from a legal point of view. From a practical point of view, there is 
certainly unity of interest. 
After the loan proceeds are paid, the banker has performed his 
legal obligation. The only obligation left to be performed is the 
borrower's repayment of the loan. In that aspect the banker is a 
partner with the borrower. If any calamity befalls the borrower, or 
any other type of detrimental thing happens, the lender is unlikely 
to get repaid on schedule, or may be unlikely to be paid at all. In 
this situation, there is a unity of interest, because the lender now 
becomes interested in seeing that the borrower remains healthy and 
has a cash flow sufficient to repay his obligations. For this reason, 
9. Johnson Debt Default Act, ch. 112, 48 Stat. 574 (1934), as amended by ch. 399, § 9, 
59 Stat. 516 (1945) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1976)) . 
10. Adede, supra note 8, at 239. 
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unity of interest is really a more appropriate term. Partner implies 
certain legal relationships. 
MR. HAWLEY: Bankers do not start with a loan agreement 
drawn up with the intention of finding problems that allow declar-
ing someone in default. That is not the nature of the business. We 
are not in business to declare people in default. In fact, the opposite 
is probably true. We end up delaying a declaration of default in 
many cases. 
From the beginning, we try to take a different view, particularly 
when lending to governments. Countries do not disappear when 
they have serious financial problems in the way that corporations 
do. Countries do not easily go bankrupt. A country with resources, 
trained population, growing economy, improving standard of living, 
and so forth must be looked at in a longer term view than simply 
the monetary difficulties it may be having in the balance of pay-
ments. 
We establish in national negotiations ways which will allow our 
relationship to achieve the purposes intended. When there are bal-
ance of payments difficulties, and foreign exchange constraints, our 
reaction is not to suggest immediately that we reschedule all of the 
debt. Rather, we look at the whole economic management and sta-
bilization program of the country. We respond to questions on what 
it will take to regain ability to borrow from private lenders around 
the world. -
If the country determines _that it does need refinancing, because 
of reversals, because of changes in terms of trade, or other factors, 
we will sit down and work with that country to shape a program of 
which our refinancing would be a part. We regard our refinancing 
as part of a larger program. We refinance only when it is clear that 
a new program is underway and is actually being carried out with 
the political will necessary to put it through. Otherwise, we do not 
regard ourselves as obliged to pump that new money into the coun-
try. 
We are often perceived as having a hostage relationship to the 
borrower. This is because we either have large funds which we have 
made available in past loans on which there may now be a problem 
developing, or because of some other aspect of our relationship with 
the borrower. It may be that we have a branch network which in-
cludes a significant branch in a given country. History shows that 
we have pulled out of countries when we faced blackmail threats 
against a branch. The operation of a branch is not considered that 
important in the patterns of international lending today. It is not 
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an essential or vital piece of our operation. When countries want to 
exert greater control over foreign investors, they put pressures on a 
foreign bank that is present and operating there. Under circum-
stances where we lose our freedom of action, and the kind of control 
that we feel that we ought to have over our own operation, we pre(er 
to withdraw. 
PROF. GOLDIE: That was a very full and comprehensive an-
swer, and I am very glad you took the opportunity to go back to your 
hostage analogy and characterize a partner as a hostage. Before we 
move on to the next series of questions, I would like to give the floor 
to Professor Franck to discuss the recent refinancing regarding Peru. 
PROF. FRANCK: I want to ask either Mr. Hawley or Mr. Beller 
to explain a subject treated very extensively in Dr. Adede's paper. 
How is your role different from that of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)? 11 Is it just a question of emulating the policy you would 
like to have the debtor country follow? The Monetary Fund is pro-
bably inclined to put its conditions on the table, while you seem to 
11. The International Monetary Fund, established in July of 1944, was the final product 
of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bret.ton Woods, New Hamp-
shire. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the principal legal basis of the Fund, entered 
into force on December 27, 1945. These Articles constitute "organic" law of the Fund and 
are aimed at stabilizing international currency and investment relationships on a multilateral 
basis. The express purposes of the Fund, as outlined in Article I of the Articles of Agreement, 
are: 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institu-
tion which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on interna-
tional monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment 
and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members 
as primary objectives of economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multi-lateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources available to 
them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destruc-
tive of national or international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature December 
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. For further discussion, see H. 
AUFRICHT, THE FUND AGREEMENT: LIVING LAW AND EMERGING PRACTICE (1969); H. AUFRICHT, 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: LEGAL BASES, STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS (1964); J. GOLD, 
THE STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1970). 
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drive at asking the government to come up with a new way of look-
ing at things. And you seem to reserve judgment until you are satis-
fied that they have been able to formulate an acceptable approach. 
MR. HAWLEY: When a government comes to us to explore the 
possibilities of further borrowing, for balance of payments purposes, 
that country is exhibiting a choice, or at least is exploring its op-
tions. Not every country is willing to go with the International Mon-
etary Fund. Some countries will immediately go to the Fund as their 
first line of defense in a balance of payments jam and make use of 
the credit tranches that they have there. The early credit tranches, 
the first ones drawn on, can be drawn on with very little commit-
ment towards following any specific changes in an economic pro-
gram. When more money is borrowed from the Fund, the conditions 
become stiffer. These conditions are not codified in the charter of 
the IMF or written down in any regulatory manual that the Fund 
has issued. Each one of these stabilization programs that the Fund 
imposes as a condition for higher credit tranches borrowings is a 
negotiated agreement worked out between the Fund and the borrow-
ing government. Recent authorization to borrow by the United 
Kingdom from the Fund was really a program proposed by the U.K. 
and worked out with the Fund in the negotiation process. The Fund 
is rather flexible, and some people will even say that it is too soft 
in the kinds of programs it imposes under difficult circumstances. 
The Fund is also criticized because its programs do not adequately 
take into eonsideration the development finance requirements of the 
country, but simply considers the balance of payments equilibrium 
goals of a particular action. 
Some governments fear going to the Fund and using what many 
regard as last ditch reserves. There are countries that will go imme-
diately to foreign countries but will only go to the Fund as a last 
resort. The case of Peru is interesting because of the way in which 
the government of Peru worked with a number of private banks. 12 
The government of Peru was involved in serious difficulties with 
large needs for balance of payments financing. The government was 
very reluctant to go to the International Monetary Fund. They went 
to the banks. The banks did not find evidence of a new economic 
program or a commitment to better management. We saw no indi-
cation down the line that we could give our national bank examiners 
any logical reason for extending a loan at this point in time, under 
12. See Adede, supra note 8, at 241 n.27; Bellivean, What the Peru Experiment Means, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1976, at 145. 
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these circumstances, as a balance of payments financing loan. 
We sat down and said you are going to have to come up with 
some kind of program. We cannot dictate a program to you, but 
before we can marshal enough private market support by going to a 
number of international banks, and pulling together the kind of 
money that you are talking about, the kind of magnitude you are 
talking about, there is going to have to be a public perception of a 
real reversal of performance in improving the economy. They came 
back with a program, we looked at the program and said that it had 
some merit but did not yet satisfy what we thought the market 
would require. We told them we would have a tough time going out 
on the market with this plan and raising money because everyone 
would look at it and see that there were no real teeth in it. They 
went back, redrafted the plan and toughened it up. 
The question is who is dictating what. What we were doing at 
Peru's request was determining for them what the market would 
require from them if they needed funds. We nurtured their economy 
by requiring performance under the new program before we would 
release the funds under the loan agreement. The International Mon-
etary Fund operates somewhat in the same way. On that specific 
point, the IMF also requires a track record. The IMF phases its 
payments on a schedule that it determines. Only when it sees a 
showing of continual performance, in line with the program that it 
has approved, will it continue to release further funds. I think this 
is something we probably learned from the IMF. We worked this out 
as a logical way of making funds available to Peru, which otherwise 
would probably not have been available at all. As a result of requir-
ing performance under a specific plan in Peru, the developing coun-
tries realize that they cannot go to the banks to borrow without any 
condition on repaying, without any improved economic program. In 
fact, these countries may now figure it is easier to go to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. 13 
PROF. FRANCK: I must disagree with Mr. Hawley and his mis-
representation of the IMF's type of intervention compared with the 
commercial banks' type of suggestion. After all, the Monetary Fund 
is based upon an agreement signed by all our debtor nations. And 
in that agreement it merely maintains the right to suggest almost 
anything in the field of fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange 
rate, import-export control,, and so on. No commercial bank ever 
13. For an analysis of the IMF conditions recently imposed upon Italy in return for a 
$S:10 million loan, see ECONOMIST, April 2, 1977, at 84. 
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signs such an agreement with a debtor. This explains some of the 
feelings of the Peruvians. 
Go back five years ago when they walked out of the negotia-
tions. Why? They were told you must devalue. There is a difference 
of what might be called articulation as to what the Monetary Fund 
can propose, and that is an important difference. The Monetary 
Fund, in contrast to the private banker, has more actual leverage 
in its hands. All minor nations have paid in, like a credit union, 
certain amounts of money. They are tied to the Fund in a much 
more direct fashion than they would be to a commercial bank. This 
needs to be emphasized, because it puts a different light on the 
interference or intervention rights. 
PROF. AUERBACH: I would just like to make one further point 
on how the IMF operates. The IMF is an international agency con-
structed by governments and it has a structure unique from other 
international institutions outside of the Bretton-Woods group. The 
voting rights, and one could argue the political influence of member 
governments, is not one state-one vote. It is a weighted voting 
scheme where each member's vote is weighted according to its sub-
scription and participation in the Fund. A number of studies have 
shown that the way the Fund, and to a large extent the World Bank, 
operates makes it less of an autonomous institution and more in 
concert or in parallel with the major governments that are members. 
Needless to say, the voting weights provide for the United States, 
Japan, German Federal Republic, France, and the United Kingdom 
as the major actors. So we quickly move into the area of political 
economy. 
While it is true, I suppose, that the banker making a loan to 
an individual might assess credit worthiness, one must ask how you 
go about assessing the credit worthiness of a state. Clearly, political 
calculations must go into assessing credit worthiness. But then one 
has to ask what goes into the calculation of political credit worthi-
ness and what is political credit in the context of international fi-
nancial activity. We have seen a number of instances in which de-
cisions were made favoring certain states as far as IMF and World 
Bank loans are concerned. The decision not to lend is just as politi-
cal · as any other kind of foreign policy decision that the United 
States Government, or any other government, might make. 
MR. TRIMBLE: I think it is significant that the IMF does not 
have any competitors. I am sure that competition puts a restraining 
factor on the kind of conditions or interventions that a bank would 
propose to a government. 
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MR. HAWLEY: The charge that lending .institutions are in a 
dominating position, able to intervene and somehow work changes 
in domestic affairs of other countries which are theoretically none 
of their business, would be indeed a very serious matter if there were 
no alternate sources of funds. But, when governments are faced with 
balance . of payments problems, they talk to more than one bank. 
They approach the international agencies, including the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and then try to make rational choices as to 
what is in their national interest to do. No single bank can fill the 
balance of payments gap of one of the major developing countries. 
We try to describe to a country like Peru what it will take for it to 
get back into the private markets and be able to borrow. The fact 
that there are several potential sources is very relevant. 
MR. BELLER: Dr. Adede, in his paper, mentioned the possibil-
ity of future collaboration between private commercial banks and 
the IMF .14 The suggestion deserves an important amount of atten-
tion on our part. Cooperation with the IMF would make a greater 
amount of funds available. The IMF can require the development 
of economic policies which a private commercial bank could not be 
able to possibly even suggest. 
Cross default clauses would provide the private banks with a 
certain amount of protection. With a cross default clause, if there 
was a default to the private bank, it would be considered a default 
to the IMF. Private banks would be protected to some extent be-
cause any default would affect the defaulting nation's credit with 
the IMF. I think collaboration between private commercial banks 
and the IMF may be the trend of the future. 
PROF. AUERBACH: We must remember that the IMF, the World 
Bank, 15 and the private financial institutions are not unrelated. 
14. Adede, supra note 8, at 246. 
15. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also known as the 
World Bank, was also the product of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, supra note 11. 
From time to time the Bank has organized Consultative Groups, such as the Consultative 
Consortium on Aid Flows, from developed, capital-providing countries and international 
organizations for the purpose of coordinating the flow of finance and technical assistance to 
developing countries. The express objectives of the Bank, set out in Article 1 of the Agree-
ment, are: 
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by 
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restora-
tion of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive 
facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of produc-
tive facilities and resources in less developed countries. 
(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations 
in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when private capital 
10
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Both the World Bank and the IMF are sort of articulators of who 
is a good risk and who is a bad risk. These are highly independent 
agencies and institutions acting and interacting. We are not dealing 
with the Adam Smith approach to financing. It is not as if we have 
an infinite number of suppliers in a market arrangement. These are 
highly independent agencies and institutions acting and interact-
ing. 
An analogy might be that of two large enterprises confronting 
each other in a negotiated order. One comment on a negotiated 
order. The IMF has the threat of nonagreement with any proposed 
program of fiscal monetary belt tightening, so that from a country's 
point of view, which is seeking assistance from the IMF, there is 
already a past record. It may not be stipulated in a book that if you 
have these problems then we have a specific course of action. 
Whether or not there are stipulated IMF or World Bank conditions 
in advance may not make all that much difference. 
PROF. LILLICH: First, I would like to comment about what has 
been said so far. Then, I would like to shift our discussion to another 
area. 
Political conditions have always been laid down by major 
banks. In the last c.entury the influence of the Rothchilds is an 
example. 16 Sophisticated bankers, like Mr. Hawley, realize that it 
can be political dynamite if there is any rupture with the borrowing 
country. Linking the efforts to influence economic policies by pri-
vate banks to the IMF, rather than having them articulated only 
from the bank, is an exceptionally interesting development. 
is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, 
on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds 
raised by it and its other resources. 
(iii) To promote long-range balanced growth of international trade and the mainte-
nance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international invest-
ment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting 
in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territo-
ries. 
(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans 
through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and small 
alike, will be dealt with first. 
(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international invest-
ment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate post-
war years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peace-
time economy. 
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened 
for signature December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.l.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. 
16. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the House of Rothschild on European 
politics, see COUNT EGON CAESAR CORTI, THE RISE OF THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD (1928). 
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I would like to move our discussion to another area of Dr. 
Adede's paper. I was intrigued with his analysis of the internation-
alization of loan agreements. Dr. Adede questions whether conces-
sion agreements, in effect, give rise to some instantaneous interna-
tional right.'7 If it can be shown that breach of a loan contract gives 
rise to a property right, a bank may be able to get the assistance of 
the foreign office of the country involved. Parenthetically, it is inter-
esting that Mr. Trimble tells us that a contract is interpreted by the 
Department of State as a property right for rescheduling purposes. 
Therefore, we have to get congressional consent. Yet, the assistant 
legal advisor for international claims will tell us the contract right 
is not a property right when it comes to the government espousing 
a claim. In other words, the government, as in so many areas, wants 
to have it two ways. Dr. Adede's analysis, both his descriptive anal-
ysis and his own approach, is certainly sound. His only problem is 
that he stops about ten years ago and doesn't continue the debate, 
either in the literature or in the analysis, up to the present day. It 
seems to me that the attempt of the articles that he cites in his 
paper is to, in effect, make a concession agreement an international 
treaty. This argument has never gotten anywhere, either in the de-
bates of the American Law Institute, or certainly from the point of 
view of convincing the officials in the Department of State. We are 
talking about a private loan, a loan by Citi-Bank, for example, to a 
developing country. When there is a breach, or a potential breach, 
the situation is not automatically elevated into an international 
matter. 
I have a second comment on Dr. Adede's paper. I do not think 
that recent developments in the area of sovereign immunity have 
been influenced by the debt problems of the Third World. The 
whole trend for the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity devel-
oped in Belgium at the turn of the century when there were not any 
Socialist states. There were not any Third World states, there were 
just European states and colonies and territories. Aside from the 
Soviet bloc, the last stronghold of the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity, Great Britain, appears to be breaking down. Dr. Adede 
asserts that because there is a trend towards relaxing the sovereign 
immunity doctrine, a trend towards allowing suits against foreign 
governments, we have more effective legal remedies. 18 Frankly, I 
17. Adede, supra note 8, at 249. 
18. Id. at 259. 
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think Dr. Adede overrates the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity. 
It was good to see the new bill discussed in Dr. Adede's paper 
adopted in the United States. rn It is nice to see Great Britain finally 
falling in line. I think we all have to realize that this is a very 
marginal thing which may help a given creditor in a given moment, 
but it is hardly the type of remedy that any creditor, much less a 
multinational bank, would be interested in having. In this area, we 
really do not have very effective remedies. If we take a look at the 
whole history of the international law surrounding not only loans in 
the past, but also foreign investment in the past, we find marginal 
measures of enforcement. Enforcement is not achieved through the 
use of legal machinery and traditional doctrines of customary inter-
national law. Loan payments are made because of a variety of eco-
nomic and political factors. Some of the political, and indeed, mili-
tary factors are no longer present. We have new factors that today 
play a role, but it seems that customary international law and tradi-
tional doctrine are only marginally relevant. 
MR. HAWLEY: On the question of jurisdiction, my institution 
would not require New York law exclusively. We might accept 
United Kingdom law.and certain others. Our choice is not restricted 
to the United States. The decision on jurisdiction and th national 
law to be used in resolving a debt difficulty, which is worked into 
the loan agreement initially during the negotiations, is not primarily 
based on the kind of considerations that Dr. Adede lists. He states 
that our decision stems from our skepticism that the developing 
country's judicial system can do justice. We do not make a judg-
ment on the level of sophistication of the borrowing country's sys-
tem. In all cases we want a jurisdiction somewhere not under the 
control of the borrower. 
I turn now to the topic of political conditions, which as Profes-
sor Lillich mentioned, have always been imposed by the lender's 
nation. But in situations where no political conditions have been 
placed on the lender by the country it is in, the lending has never, 
in my own experience, involved a judgment that was affected by 
approval of a political system. Now this is something quite different 
from saying that there are not, or are, political considerations in-
volved in the analysis of the credit worthiness of the country. We 
will consider whether or not a government that has just embarked 
19. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). For Dr. Adede's 
discussion of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see Adede, supra note 8, at 255-57. 
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on a new economic stability program is likely to be overthrown next 
week because it is so weak and the social instability of the country 
is so great. We will question the political stability of a certain gov-
ernment to decide whether we can rely on commitments made. This 
is the kind of political analysis that is very definitely reflected in our 
judgments. But under no circumstances do we impose political con-
ditions. 
DR. ADEDE: I mention internationalization of state contracts, 
which was tried on the basis of state concessions, because it should 
be examined whether or not it would be applicable in the case of 
loan agreements. I came to the conclusion that the doctrine cannot 
be applied in this context. 
I am not saying that sovereign immunity is not relevant. I men-
tion in the paper that some loan agreements do require that a partic-
ular borrower government waive its sovereign immunity. Eastern 
countries consider this request an affront, though I understand there 
are some cases where they have agreed on financial agreements 
where there is a limit on this aspect. 
I am unwilling to discount completely the role of international 
law. Some of us are still forced to say this again because of what has 
happened to the law of taking of foreign properties abroad or expro-
priation. 
In disagreement with Mr. Hawley, I believe lenders choose 
United States law because they are not familiar with the law of the 
borrowing state. I am not sure that many United States bankers 
would even accept English law. The bank officers would have to rely 
on the English lawyers to tell them what the law is, to enable them 
to enter into meaningful discussions with their stockholders in as-
sessing whether or not they can make the loan. 
A stigma exists in the back of the minds of many people that 
the local law of a borrowing developing country is rejected because 
of lack of confidence in the ability to use it to do justice. In the loan 
between Denmark and Malawi, Denmark decided that the law ap-
plicable would be the law of Denmark. The lenders did not want to 
expose themselves to the laws of Malawi. Great Britain is also very 
cautious. While their loan agreements do not specify that the law 
of England is applicable, they provide that any disputes are subject 
to the law where the bank is located. 
PROF. GOLDIE: I would like to ask Mr. Hawley to talk about 
the political aspects of lending. 
MR. HAWLEY: We are not yet affected by any congressional or 
regulatory action in this area. An attempt could be made, either 
14
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through the federal regulatory network or through legal legislative 
action, to try to have some impact on commercial bank lending by 
injecting political requirements. But right now I think it would be 
a mistake. Any human rights weapon in the hands of the Carter 
administration is of limited value if a country's major borrowing is 
from private banks and the country seems to have unlimited access 
to private bank lending. Private banks appear to be providing a 
loophole. This is a very real issue in Congress now. The objectives 
of the U.S. Government in international economic policy are not 
restricted to achieving one goal. Congress is attempting, as always, 
to balance the achievement of goals specified in several bills. This 
is merely one of many areas where the attempt to accomplish one 
goal begins to interfere in the accomplishment of others. For exam-
ple, in terms of the discussion of sovereign immunity, we have a 
policy that whatever the laws state in terms of giving comfort 
through the legal interpretations on what types of cases are, or are 
not subject, we do not depend on those changes in legislation for our 
loan agreements. We stand by an absolute requirement that the 
borrowing government waive its sovereign immunity. Without the 
waiver, we have no assurance that the loan is sound and from my 
institution at least, there will be no loan made without a waiver of 
sovereign immunity. 
PROF. LILLICH: The new statute is important, though, because 
before a waiver meant nothing. Now the waiver means something 
that is very important in the United States. 20 
MR. TRIMBLE: In the area of nationalization and foreign in-
vestment abroad, where traditionally the value and support of inter-
national law has been cited as important to the conduct of business 
abroad, I would be very suprised if any lender really took into ac-
count, as even a marginal factor, the potential value of State De-
partment or foreign ministry intervention on its behalf to help col-
lect the loan. I would similarly be very suprised if you didn't also 
have an absolute rule requiring the loan agreement to be governed 
by New York law and payable in New York. This idea of the interna-
tionalization of a loan agreement is unrealistic. 
PROF. FRANCK: Before the human rights legislation was intro-
duced or informally used, the United States Government, in its 
20. Section 1605(a)(l) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that a foreign 
state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States if the foreign 
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l) 
(1976) . 
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lending decisions, was not oblivious to the political orientation of 
the debtor country. Commercial banks of the United States have 
been indirectly drawn into the same wake. The United States 
Government now is taking the lead in voicing its opinion in the 
council of the United Nations agencies, such as the Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. Whenever the Monetary Fund takes a lead 
and comes to some kind of agreement with the debtor government 
on what the next steps in managing their economy will be, the com-
mercial banks have not asked for more. In fact, I think they have 
been satisfied with less. If that decision from the Monetary Fund 
was in any way influenced by political consideration, then I cannot 
see how the commercial banks can avoid being drawn into the 
same considerations. Once the majority of the Monetary Fund goes 
along with whatever proposal the debtor government makes, and 
then approaches the commercial banks, I do not see how the com-
mercial banks can say they will not go along. If we accept the prop-
osition that the Monetary Fund is indirectly in control of political 
considerations of some of its leading voting members, then we must 
accept the fact that comrriercial banks are indirectly affected by 
such political considerations. 
MR. HAWLEY: There are difficulties faced by many countries 
at this time in meeting their payments, their requirements for exter-
nal capital, and finding external capital sources. However, this does 
not mean that there is something wrong with the world system be-
cause these people have to continue to borrow. Developing countries 
continue to borrow because of the nature of the development pro-
cess. These countries cannot grow without capital coming into the 
country. That does not mean that there are not some fluctuations 
in the ease with which they can handle that burden and in the fi-
nancing needs that they face. There is something almost inevitable 
about the continuing borrowing, but it does not mean that there is 
anything wrong with the world economic system. Developing na-
tions cannot generate within their own countries enough savings to 
fund continued growth. The alternative ·is no growth. We are not 
promoting that solution. 
When we run into the need for debt refinancing, there are many 
things we try to do before we attempt rescheduling the debt. Bor-
rowing countries will face balance of payments difficulties from time 
to time on a temporary basis. Refinancing is only one, and probably 
not the initial step, that you begin with when working with borrow-
ing countries. 
MR. BELLER: The question is, what do you do when a country 
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runs into difficulty? First, when faced with a country having bal-
ance of payments problems, certain structural changes within the 
economy are suggested. If that fails, a restructuring of the existing 
debt, either on a public level or on a private level, is considered. 
What I would call a disorderly debt relief has not occurred more 
than twice in the last twenty years. Disorderly debt relief means a 
unilateral moratorium on debt collection. The real thing bankers 
like to do when they see a deteriorated situation, whether it be a 
commercial loan or a sovereign loan, is to try to work it out. They 
try to extend a little expertise to prevent the situation from deterio-
rating to the point where rescheduling would be required. 
PROF. LILLICH: I disagree with both Mr. Hawley and Dr. 
Adede. The reason why banks do not want to be referred to the law 
of the borrowing country is not because of lack of certainty of that 
law. We can always get lawyers to tell us whether that law is crystal 
clear or not. Try to find out what the fiduciary obligations of corpo-
rate insiders are here in New York, under the New York blue sky 
law, and you will find something that is more confused than the 
measure of compensation in international law. I do not think that 
the problem is a lack of knowledge. Additionally, I do not think that 
Dr. Adede's suggestion about the low level of administration of jus-
tice in a particular country is necessarily a key factor. 
Everyone wants to know what the rules of the game are and 
wants not to have the rules changed. This is the key factor from the 
bankers' point of view. If you go into a loan agreement here and you 
subject yourself to Malawi law or Italian law, and they reserve the 
sovereign prerogative to change the law, change the rules of the 
game after you have started to play it, difficulties are created. Sub-
stantively, the rules of the game can always be changed, according 
to the sovereign prerogative of the state, here the borrower. You are 
nonsuited from the point of view of getting any diplomatic protec-
tion or procedural backing from the outside. This is the combination 
of eliminating any standard of compensation in the nationalization 
area on the substantive side and, of course, denying anyone of what 
the International Court of Justice has called an elementary princi-
ple of international law. This is the reason why you have references, 
as we did in the recent settlement with Peru, to the law of New 
York. If the developing states want to have loan agreements here 
that are equitably negotiated, they're going to have to be equitably 
enforced, and that cannot come by taking Article 22C thinking and 
translating it into this area. And this is why I think you will continu-
ously see references to the law of New York. 
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PROF. GOLDIE: I would like to call on Professor Lillich to speak 
on the development of international financial institutions in this 
area, particularly from the public point of view. 
PROF. LILLICH: I would like to comment briefly on Dr. Adede's 
recommendation for a new tribunal for debt rescheduling and Mr. 
Robertson's reference to something like an international bankruptcy 
court, or at least a court for rescheduling. Dr. Adede's paper goes 
into some detail about the· International Center for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, holding it out as a possible model. As far 
as I know, there has been no real development, either in the litera-
ture, or by people in government on this particular problem. One 
of the points that Dr. Adede makes in his paper is that we need to 
develop some principles or norms or guidelines, for dealing with the 
rescheduling of debt obligations which take into account the myriad 
factors brought forth this morning. As Dr. Adede's paper pointed 
out, we are dealing with all kinds of different Third World non-oil 
exporting countries and they all have to be handled differently to 
some extent. Nevertheless there should be certain norm.ative guide-
lines and some kind of process orientation rather than the kind of 
ad hoc creditors clubs that meet from time to time. Actually my 
observations are not as much observations as reflections upon the 
inadequacy of the present structures and requests for further devel-
opment of these ideas presented by Dr. Adede. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you. Before we go into our second item, 
I will first ask Dr. Adede whether he would like ad hoc to show some 
guidelines and outlines on his thoughts in addition to his paper. 
DR. ADEDE: As Professor Lillich has pointed out, one has to sit 
down and compare the models and work out something that is wor-
thy of presenting. The paper just points to these issues and makes 
suggestions. One needs to spend a great deal of time trying to work 
with these models while exploring the reasons why there has been 
little development in the financial world of these central issues. By 
isolating these Third World problems, one would increase develop-
ment of this model that has been suggested. This is an issue that 
ought to be examined and not be discussed lightly. I see an interna-
tional tribunal as a suggestion which should be given some thought. 
MR. ROBERTSON: The proposal has been tentatively ap-
proached by the Third World at the North-South dialogue, 21 but 
there should be some sort of permanent institutional machinery to 
21. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1977, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 1, col. 6. 
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which individual developing countries could go for help in renego-
tiating their financial arrangements with creditors. Behind this idea 
is the problem that it is difficult for a developing country to obtain 
the same concessions from all of the different types of creditors it 
has. If the fundamental goal of a particular renegotiation procedure 
is the reinstitution of a particular country's development progress, 
the approach taken is, first of all, to determine what the overall 
financial requirements are for that country to maintain a particular 
level of imports. At this stage of the proceedings, it does not matter 
what the source of those potential funds are. You need to obtain a 
certain rate of growth which is presumed to be adequate. 
The next stage is to determine from where those finances are 
going to come. The idea is to have a permanent institutional frame-
work that would bring together all of the different suppliers of fi-
nance into one forum. The result would be more equitable financing 
agreements. The ·idea is not any more concrete than that at the 
present moment. I might add that in this view of the situation, the 
distinction between public and private does not break down, but 
remains very much a problem. 
MR. TRIMBLE: I would strongly question the need for such 
framework. If a country wishes to refinance existing debt or arrange 
new financing, there is no mystery as to how to go about it. And 
there really, in my own personal view, is no need for any sort of an 
institutional mechanism, particularly any mechanism that would 
set preconditions as to the terms in which the loans could be negoti-
ated. As I understand the proposal, this institution would be set up 
in such a way that it would be a mechanism to which a country 
could come and demand that the existing debt be rescheduled. Its 
needs would be defined in accordance with criteria evolved within 
that institution, that would be gauged to development, not neces-
sarily financial needs, and that concessional terms would be part of 
the program. So we have the same basic problem we discussed ear-
lier in the guise of a kind of neutral institutional framework. 
MR. ROBERTSON: The idea is more than there would be a 
commitment within this ·institutional framework, on the part of the 
creditors on the one side and the debtor on the other side, to abide 
by certain rules of the game, which would include estimates of capi-
tal requirements for that country to maintain a certain development 
path. Now that is not to say, necessarily, that debt rescheduling is 
the solution. It may be additional finance, there may be changes in 
domestic policies that are required, or what have you. It's just that 
the framework would be development oriented. 
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PROF. LILLICH: I just leave you with Polonius' advice: Never a 
borrower or a lender be. 22 
MR. HAWLEY: Without going into a detailed discussion of 
these proposals, the question of a forum in which discussions are 
undertaken to tackle debt problems is one of the critical issues 
which is being raised in many quarters now. I would base any 
inspection of these proposals, in whatever form they may take, on 
the warning that we do not begin to construct rigid, codified rules; 
initiatives which have the opposite of the effect we intended to 
achieve. Mixing the private creditors with the official creditors in a 
common forum is very difficult at this moment to achieve in an 
effective way without having an eroding impact on the willingness 
of the private lenders to lend further. 
I do not want to be in the position of saying we cannot improve 
on the present. Obviously, there are some improvements that could 
be made. There could be improvements in the way official debts are 
handled among governments, perhaps by further refining the Paris 
Club arrangements, which have recently been a very last minute, 
somewhat confused exercise. These kind of improvements could be 
made. But when you talk about the linkage between the official and 
private creditors, you are moving into an area where there could 
easily be a damaging impact rather than an improving impact. The 
fundamental point is to find a solution that facilitates the continued 
flow of capital to these countries and even the expanded flow of 
capital, rather than a solution that begins to erode confidence, and, 
therefore, begins to dry up these flows. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Hawley. Now we 
come to the question before this panel, namely, is the whole problem 
not one of debt servicing, but of chronic balance of payments defi-
cits. The question then becomes, is the problem likely to go away? 
If not, are we likely to be faced with a geometric progression of 
increasing indebtedness and servicing costs? 
PROF. FRANCK: The agenda, as presented this morning, didn't 
allow for an extensive treatment of this question. We did present, 
shall we say, embryonic data to show that the problem is indeed 
linked to the balance of payments deficit on current accounts which 
Mr. Hawley and myself suggested will be an enduring feature of 
countries in the process of development. This is nothing to be con-
demned and does not reflect mismanagement necessarily. In a few 
22. Hamlet, Act I, Scene Ill. 
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cases there was evidence of mismanagement or bad management, 
but in most cases it is simply an excess of the foreign exchange over 
what the economy of the less developed countries can now produce. 
To be specific, the World Bank just put out separate G .N .P. figures 
for low-income countries earning less than two hundred dollars per 
capita. 23 There are a billion people living in those countries. Their 
per capita income has been stationary for four years at ninety-one 
dollars, 24 an estimate put out by the World Bank. These same coun-
tries are now owing thirty-two billion dollars. 25 Determining what 
internal adjustment would be necessary to discharge this debt serv-
ice on thirty-two billion dollars is where the problem is. Some coun-
tries are facing serious adjustments on the internal front. Unless 
foreign external resources are available, until these countries are 
over the development hurdle their problems will be compounded. 
The last Chase Manhattan report for 1976 that was put out indi-
cated that they were getting at least as much in 1975 from private 
banks. 26 At the same time, the judgment of the Chase Manhattan 
Bank on this issue is that the non-oil LDCs have utilized the 
amount of unused borrowing capacity that was available to them 
and the 1976 borrowing increased their debts by another fourteen 
billion dollars. As a result, the ability of the LDCs, either to post-
pone the adjustment to higher oil prices or to follow a statute of 
gradual adjustment, is beaming increasingly limited. 
In other words, they worry that there will be a gradual, more 
rigorous application of credit criteria as the amount of outstanding 
debt created by balance of payments deficits begins to make some 
lenders nervous. 
Some of these countries happen to be politically important to 
the United States, and, therefore, the United States Government 
now becomes worried about their economic, financial stability and 
viability in relation to the political objectives of the State Depart-
ment. When they see financial troubles undermining the stability 
of a country, reinforced by obvious signs of deliberate instability, 
they begin to worry. There is reason to worry. It is a combination of 
development hurdles, as well as difficulties of finding an indefinitely 
external resource. The OPEC countries are now using up increasing 
23. (1976) INT'L RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. BANK ANN. REP. 1. 
24. INT. RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES (April, 1977). 
25. N .Y. Times, May 15, 1977, §3 (Business and Finance), at 13, col. 1. 
26. Id., April 20, 1977, §3 (Business and Finance), at 49, col. 8. 
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amounts of their own surpluses, and in 1976, only Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait maintained continuous surpluses. Others have gradually 
increased their import capacity with sufficient rapidity so that less 
will be available to other countries involved through the round-
about channel of the European dollar market. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, the only ones left, are both pushing the capacity for import 
and signing contracts to build new installations. I do not feel that 
we can count indefinitely on the fueling of bank resources in Europe, 
or on OPEC. 
MR. HAWLEY: I have some comments on the points that Pro-
fessor Franck has just made. On numbers, I would be cautious. I 
have not looked at the Chase report in detail, but we have to con-
tinue to draw a distinction when we refer to the World Bank num-
bers on the countries with per capita incomes at the lowest end of 
the scale. We must once again break down the kind of debt we are 
talking about. In this case we are talking about almost entirely 
official credits to those countries. We are talking about a problem 
that is to be faced by intergovernmental groups, the World Bank, 
the International Fund, and other groups through which we all ex-
press our political will and decision making. The Chase numbers 
were ref erring only to private bank lending and we are referring to 
all the LDCs. Once again, it is just an example of the complexity of 
dealing with these numbers and keeping constantly aware of what 
is behind each number in order to accurately ascertain the conse-
quences. One final comment, it is true that the OPEC surplus may 
decline, but if the OPEC surpluses decline, counter-balancing 
deficits are thrust on the less developed countries and they will 
benefit by this situation, either directly or indirectly. Our problem 
has been that the OPEC countries have not been able to import 
enough to stimulate and to contribute to the trade balances around 
the world. But this should begin over a longer period of time to have 
some helpful impact. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Hawley. Barry 
Beller wishes to make a very brief comment about lending limits. 
MR. BELLER: Some of the congressional restraints that U.S. 
public agencies have with respect to lending were mentioned earlier. 
I want to mention that U.S. banks also have legal lending limits, 
so even for argument's sake, if we felt that a particular country was 
credit worthy to the extent of a billion dollars, for example, a partic-
ular bank may only be able to lend it a hundred million. It should 
be emphasized that there are legal constraints upon the banks 
which determine how far they can go regardless of credit worthiness 
or lack of it. 
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MR. TRIMBLE: Another way of looking at the basic problem is 
that it is caused by the price of oil, an increase which was unjustified 
by market forces, and continues to be unjustified by market forces, 
or by any concept of equity. That was the cause and remains the 
cause. The ultimate solution is to decrease our dependence and this 
pertains particularly to the United States. It is not until we really 
do that and get serious about it that there is going to be any long 
term answer to this disequilibrium problem. In the meantime, what 
happens? One answer is that we will continue the process. The 
international system has worked, and has been quite remarkable in 
the last three years. The increase in private lending has taken up a 
lot of the gap, and there is no reason to assume that this will not 
continue. But the countries that are benefiting by this are not the 
lndias or the Pakistans. The less developed countries in the world 
have to rely on either reducing their imports or otherwise taking 
what can be drastic internal measures. Or they have to look to 
public loans, concessional loan, or old style foreign aid. To the ex-
tent that there is any meaningful answer to their problems in the 
immediate term, official lending, official assistance, increase in the 
World Bank capabilities, perhaps expansion at the International 
Monetary Fund, concessional facilities and things of this sort are the 
only relief. 
PROF. AUERBACH: One of the underlying assumptions of the 
whole conference is that this debt which has been undertaken for 
"development" will some day lead LDCs into a position where they 
might not need further debt. I am trying to think of some other 
LDCs that hav~ gotten off the ground, and not too many come to 
mind. It goes to the nature of what is the development process. The 
economists have debated for years and there is no agreement yet. 
The World Bank has argued that capital intensive development 
is the road to go, that is to say if enough capital is pumped into a 
country, the increase in GNP and growth rates can be predicted 
fairly well. It provides a good statement as to how well off that 
country is becoming. That has not worked all the time and now the 
Bank itself is moving to a different set of standards or criteria. 
Robert McNamara, the president of the Bank, articulated some 
years ago this notion that we must be concerned with equity, or in 
other words, the poorest forty percent. I am talking about the World 
Bank itself, not the International Development Association, which 
is its soft credit agency, nor the International Finance Corporation. 
I am concerned with the Bank, which operates more or less as a bank 
with fairly strict market competitive interest rates. Even now the 
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World Bank, in its project analysis and proposal is looking to 
whether a project is going to make any difference on the poorest 
forty percent or not. This is a radical departure for the Bank on how 
it not only analyzes projects but also in deciding which projects it 
will front. In the most recent Bank report that I saw, McNamara 
parades the fact that Bank lending in the agricultural sector has 
improved two or three times over the past few years. This may not 
necessarily help the poorest countries. 
Presumably, what it means is that there will be a different 
purpose for these bank loans. This is important because it may 
indicate an alternative model for the development process. 
Forgetting about the Bank for a moment, there is an existing 
alternative model, the Chinese model of self-reliant growth. From 
the few press reports I have seen, it seems that the recently elected 
government of India is at least making noises towards self-reliant 
growth. We will have to wait and see what it does. The alternative 
that seems to be implicit here between no growth and capital inten-
sive growth is not quite accurate. As part of this different Bank 
lending policy, there has been an agreed upon increase in the annual 
rate of bank loan commitments. There is already in the works a 
selective capital increase in the Bank's capitalization, which, once 
it gets passed, will increase as well available Bank lending re-
sources.27 
MR. HAWLEY: Two brief comments on this trickle-down and 
ripple effect before we move on, because I do not want them con-
fused. The OPEC surplus causes a corresponding deficit among the 
rest of the world, if it is looked at in simplified terms, and I ob-
viously oversimplified before. It does not help very much to think 
of it in this simplistic way, but many people do. The rest of the 
world divides, in some ways, shares of the corresponding deficit. We 
have tried in many of the public institutions and governments to 
figure out ways of making that burden as easy a burden as possible 
on the developing countries. This was one of the reasons behind the 
Carter administration and the Trilateral Commission's early policy 
moves toward trying to stimulate the major economies, the United 
States, Germany, Japan, and so forth, so that the major countries 
would not be running surpluses as well and pushing more and more 
deficits onto the LDCs. The way this works, and admittedly it is 
27. INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK ANNUAL MEETING, Res. 314, 
315, adopted by the Board of Governors, [1977] INT'L RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. BANK ANN. 
REP. 202-05. 
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indirect, is that as the OPEC surplus declines, and there is less of a 
deficit that has to be shared, the immediate stimulus takes place 
in their purchase of manufactured goods directly from the West. But 
the stimulated demand for that equipment in turn is what drives 
the demand for the commodities from the LDCs up. 
PROF. AUERBACH: Well, fortunately for Europe, the Russians 
came along, in a sense, one could make that argument. After the 
perceived threat to Western Europe it became quite clear to Con-
gress and to the Executive that we have to help reconstruct Europe 
and we can not wait for the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development to do this. The Marshall plan came along, and 
NATO came along, and we had economic development, political 
stability, and a military alliance. There is not that commitment to 
the Third World. The West does not see the perceived risk. If there 
was a similar perceived risk to the American interests, as a similar 
risk was perceived in Europe, you might get a different response. 
But I am not convinced that Congress is all that hesitant, in some 
respects they are, and in some other respect I think they're not. 
PROF. GOLDIE: I will call on Professor Franck who will be inter-
ested in speaking to this point. 
PROF. FRANCK: Let us recall how the Dawes Debt was han-
dled.211 There was a decision in terms of the risk perceived that if you 
pressed Germany too hard on those World War I debts you may 
create more damage to the whole international community than any 
financial benefit that may come out of this. So without too much 
trouble, the Dawes debt was cancelled. Take a look at the lend-lease 
debt. We would be willing to close our eyes to some of those carry-
overs for political reasons again. There may be a reason why in 
certain parts of the world the risks mentioned will be perceived, 
hopefully soon. 
MR. TRIMBLE: One of the most significant things that we could 
do now would be to agree in the multinational tariff negotiations to 
a very substantial cut in the tariff levels of semi-processed, semi-
manufactured products. That would probably be as beneficial to the 
economic future of the less developed world as anything we could 
do. We may actually be able to do that, because we have fairly 
broad authority under the existing trade act. But the problem is 
that we are in an age of very incipient protectionism, and, if you 
follow the workings of the International Trade Commission, you will 
28. The Dawes Debt was the result of reparations from the First World War. 
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notice that there is a definite trend of very restrictive import relief. 
The procedures under which the Commission works impose severe 
import relief. The President can refuse the advice and do something 
less restrictive but that is subject to override by Congress. There is 
always a deterrent held by the Congress that puts us very near a 
wave of protectionism. Any time you do something to help the 
LDCs, if it is going to cut into American industry jobs, you skate 
on very thin ice, particularly at this time. This reinforces the ab-
sence of any sort of political or ideological commitment such as we 
had to Europe. 
PROF. GOLDIE: I will now call on Mr. Hawley, and I think we 
can make this the closing presentation. 
MR. HAWLEY: There is a recent case which seems to illustrate 
many of the problems which we have touched upon today and fits 
right into the main topic of discussion. The country of Zaire, depen-
dent heavily on copper exports, got into severe balance of payments 
difficulties in 1975 and went into arrears on large amounts of exter-
nal debt to a mixture of creditors all over the world: governments, 
private banks, mainly in large bank syndicates. The Export-Import 
Bank was involved in many major projects in Zaire to help them 
expand the copper facilities and the supporting electric power in-
frastructure for copper production. The world economy and internal 
problems overwhelmed the best efforts of the country. The country 
fell into arrears in making its debt payments. We were faced with a 
major problem which fits precisely into our topic today, one that 
differs very much from some of the other examples, such as the 
Peruvian example where the country really never did get into ar· 
rears on payments. In most of these cases the banks and the other 
creditors have been able to work together with the borrowing gov-
ernment in a way that anticipated the problem and avoided a spe-
cific rescheduling conference. In this case there were communica-
tion problems and great uncertainties as to the intentions and the 
capabilities of the government involved in terms of meeting its var-
ious obligations, which were a very complex mixture of official and 
private obligations. The initial outlook tended to use one number 
as a rough estimate of the total debt of the country. There was no 
early attempt to segregate the types of debt involved or to break 
them apart for serious analysis of what would be a more productive 
solution to the problem than initially appeared intuitively obvious. 
The first groups to move toward a solution, because they were 
the first groups to which the government of Zaire went in search of 
debt relief through official creditors, were quite logically the govern-
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ments. This was done in negotiations that took place in Paris in an 
informal forum, known as the Paris Club. This group of government 
creditors grew up in the early days of refinancing back in the 1950s 
and was concerned with international monetary questions before the 
payment system had evolved to the point where it has today. It was 
designed to handle other kinds of problems, but gradually evolved 
into a debt renegotiation club, the group's primary preoccupation 
today. Governments gathered in Paris in June, 1976, and hurriedly 
negotiated an agreement describing the type of new scheduling. In 
this case, we are talking about a rescheduling in the sense of l;l 
stretching out of the maturity schedules and repayment schedules, 
on Zaire's official and officially guaranteed debt. No participant in 
the room, that I have been able to find, actually knew how much 
debt they were talking about. There was no central record anywhere 
of precisely who were the creditors nor of the amount of all the debts 
and maturity schedules. The governments agreed on the general 
outlines of the settlement and then adjourned leaving the detailed 
negotiations to be carried out bilaterally between each government, 
the borrowing government and the central bank. 
Not long after that everyone was waiting to see what the banks 
would do. In Washington, the conventional wisdom was that since 
the agreement in Paris all that was left to be done was to take the 
same schedule and stretch the debt out the same way. There was a 
general expectation this would be done. It was true at the Treasury 
and the State Department; it was true at the International Mone-
tary Fund and in the Central Bank of Zaire, which also assumed 
that we would take the same model and stretch the debt out. In-
deed, we sat down with the Central Bank of Zaire and began to 
examine this question in light of the comments I made this morning, 
namely the search for a solution that looks to the future and tries 
to rebuild the country's access to needed sources of financing, rather 
than a solution that endangers future sources of financing in the 
private market. We pointed out that if there is a way to avoid a 
conspicuous failure in their obligations to the private creditors, if 
there is a way to actually make those payments, there may be a way 
to recreate the credit ratings of the country as part of an effort to 
get the economy moving again. Granted, there were many assump-
tions and much hoping involved in this. There are assumptions on 
the course of the world economy and on the course of movements, 
political events in central Africa and many other things. All of us 
agreed it would be worth the effort to make the most detailed exami-
nation of the numbers possible, of the balance of payments ac-
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counts, all the trade accounts, export figures, what the market 
seemed to call for, and how the next year or so seemed to look. The 
agreement that this was an avenue to explore was quickly reached 
and explored in great detail by working closely with the government 
of Zaire from the· beginning. 
There is the distinction made, which I feel is critical to a pro-
ductive solution to these problems, and that is the distinction be-
tween official credits and private credits. The distinction being im-
portant because of what we perceive to be the different impacts on 
a country's future access to finance on their failure to make commit-
ments to official creditors as opposed to failure to meet commit-
ments to official creditors. We decided not to follow the Paris model, 
but rather to explore the possible course of action that would involve 
repayment of the debt. We first had to measure and see what por-
tion of the debt really was private credit and whether it was man-
ageable. It was determined that it was manageable, under certain 
assumptions, given a reasonable course of events in and outside of 
Zaire. Zaire agreed to;take certain actions, which were again along 
the lines of the discussion we had earlier about Peru. 
The question put to us was basically is there a chance of restor-
ing our credit ratings? If so, how would you describe what we would 
have to do in order to be able to go into the market again and be 
able to get access to private funds some time in 1977? Once it was 
determined to be fiscally and financially possible that they would 
repay all the interest, we worked out an agreement with them bring-
ing themselves up to date on interest payments. This agreement was 
reached before the end of 1976. They agreed to pay their principal 
arrears within a short time period over the first few months of 1977. 
At the same time, they began a series of self-imposed measures 
determined to improve the management and performance of the 
domestic economy and also established a new debt management 
office at a senior level of the government to get a better handle on 
the numbers and better control over their external accounts, partic-
ularly borrowing from abroad. We pointed out that "in order to raise 
the kind of money they were going to need, they would have to have 
some kind of a credential to show not only that they asserted they 
were trying to improve their economic situation in their country, but 
something that would be a card of entry, more or less, back into the 
financial markets. We determined with them that the most appro-
priate way in this case would be to apply for and to be granted 
eligibility to draw on the higher credit tranches of the IMF. This was 
done not so much with the idea that they would draw the money, 
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but simply because we wanted the world to perceive Zaire as having 
qualified as being eligible to draw that money which certified a 
certain level of performance. Once these conditions were met, we 
then undertook to use our best efforts to raise the large amount of 
money in the international market that we determined Zaire would 
need. This agreement combined a number of lessons that we talked 
a bout today. It showed the lender and the borrower working to-
gether to reach a solution that was productive rather than destruc-
tive in the market perception of the country, and which tries to 
maximize their position for future financing of their continued bal-
ance of payments deficits. This illustrates the way in which the 
private institutions already work closely with the International 
Monetary Fund, however, never blurring the important distinction 
between private credit and official credit, which I stressed at the 
outset. Any policy moves that may now be taken, either within the 
U.S. Government or within the international institutions, to for-
malize a linkage between private creditors and either government 
or international institutions has to be drafted very carefully in order 
to retain the flexibility that is required, by not only diversity within 
the countries, but also the fact that every one of these individual 
situations we have faced over the past twenty years has differed 
significantly from the others. They all had unique characteristics, 
and I hestitate to endorse a rule, code or linkage that would reduce 
our flexibility in coping most effectively with these problems. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you. 
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